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LEONARDO TARAN
The interpretation of Heraclitus will always remain controversial.
The main reasons are his peculiar mode of expression, the fragmen-
tary character of the evidence, and the very way ancient authors
quoted his sayings. If progress is still to be made, it is necessary to
discuss the arguments given in support of one or another interpre-
tation in order to determine in each case what is probable, what is
merely possible, and what is unlikely or impossible. Such a discussion
should contribute to clarify the points on which scholarly opinion is
likely to differ and to eliminate poor and irrelevant arguments. The
following analysis of Heraclitus' first fragment has been prompted,
among other things, by the preceding considerations. The fragments
will be cited according to the numbers in the B section of chapter
22 of Diels-Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker.^ For the sake of
brevity my discussion takes its starting point from, and presupposes
knowledge of, the commentaries of Kirk^ and of Marcovich.^ This
explains the prominent character of my disagreements with these
' I refer to the 6th edition, 3 vols., Berlin 1951-52. The alleged later editions
are mere reprints. This work is referred to as FVS.
^ G. S. Kirk, Heraclitus. The Cosmic Fragments (Cambridge 1954; reprinted, with
corrections, 1962; my references are to the latter). Hereafter = Kirk.
^ M. Marcovich, Heraclitus. Greek Text with a Short Commentary (Merida, Venezuela
1967) and Eraclito. Frammenti. Introduzione, e commento (Florence 1978). Hereafter
these books are referred to as Marcovich' and Marcovich^, respectively.
The following publications will be cited by their authors' names alone: E. Zeller,
Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entu'icklung I, ii^ (Leipzig 1920).
Herausgegeben von W. Nestle; J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy'* (London 1930); K.
Reinhardt, Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie (Bonn 1916); O.
Gigon, Untersuchungen zu Heraklit (Leipzig 1935); R. Walzer, Eraclito. Raccolta dei
frammenti e traduzione italiana (Florence 1939). Other references will be self-
explanatory.
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two scholars. For the reader's convenience I print the text with a
short critical apparatus in which purely orthographical variants have
been disregarded.
ToO" X6701; T0O6' ibvTOc, ai'ei'' a^wiroi yivovrai avdpuiiroi Koi irpbaOfv rj ocKOvaai
Kot ocKOvaavTec, to irpCjTOv yivofiivijiv yap iravTo^i'' Kara rov \byov rovbt
airiipoiaiv ioUaai -KiipdnevoL kol iireoju kuI Ipywv roioxnitiv oko'kjjp eycb dirfyevnou
Kara' <t>vaLi' diaipiiov eKaarov' koi (ppa^cjju OKU)q
€x*f tovc, 6t aXXovq audpCxKOvq
\avdavu OKoaa iyipOePTtq iroiomip OKuairep OKoaa (vbovreq iirikavdavovTai.
"rov Aristotle, Clement: rov bl Hippolytus: om. Sextus Wei Aristotle,
Clement, Hippolytus: om. Sextus TravTicv Hippolytus: om. Sextus
'Kara . . . (Kaarov Sextus: bupeuv Kara (f>miv Hippolytus (omitting eKaarov).
The entire fragment is cited by Sextus Empiricus {Adv. Math. VII.
132) only. It is possible that the omission of tov or rov bt (see infra),
of aid, and of ttocvto^v are due neither to him nor to his source but
to one or more scribes. Hippolytus {Ref. Omn. Haeres. IX. 9. 3 [pp.
241-42 Wendland]) gives the passage up to ex^^ omitting the final
comparison {tovc, b\ aWovq . . . einXavdavovTaL). Clement {Strom. V.
111.7 [II, pp. 401-02 Stahlin]) has the first sentence only, from tov
to TTpOiTov, and Eusebius {Praeparatio Evangelka XIII. 13. 39 [II, p.
214 Mras]) himself quotes this passage of Clement's. Finally, also
Aristotle {Rhet. 1407 B 16-17) cites the first sentence, but only from
TOV to audpooTTOL yiyvovTai (in this order).
Both Aristotle and Sextus tell us that this text occurred at the
beginning of Heraclitus' book. However, neither the former's Iv
apxy auToO'* TOV cvyypannaToq nor the latter's evapxbp.tvoq (sc.
'Hpa/cXftToq) . . . tChv irepl ^Oatcoq necessarily implies that those in our
fragment were the very first words of Heraclitus' treatise.'^ This topic
has been usually discussed in connection with whether at the beginning
of our text one should read tov Xoyov or tov 8e Xbyov. A majority of
recent scholars, including Kirk and Marcovich,^ has adopted the latter
reading, though it is transmitted by Hippolytus only. The reason
given is that advanced by Zeller' long ^go- it is easy to see that be
'* This is the reading of the MSS. Ross and Kassel in their respective editions of
Aristotle's Rhetoric, Marcovich, and others have adopted Richard's emendation avry.
To my mind the emendation is not at all necessary; but even if it is adopted, it would
really not affect the point at issue here, since even iv apxy ocvry tov avyypannaroq
would leave open the possibility that some words preceded 22 B 1 in the Heraclilean
original.
' Cf. F. Susemihl, ya/jr6. / Class. Philol. 107 (1873), 146, followed by Nestle in
Zeller-Nestle 1, ii^ p. 793, note; W. Capelle, Hermes 59 (1924), 202; W.J. Verdenius,
Mnemosyne, III sen, 13 (1947), 271; Kirk, p. 35.
'' Kirk, pp. 33 and 36; Marcovich', p. 2 = Marcovich^, p. 4.
^ Cf. Zeller in Zeller-Nestle, I, ii^, p. 792, note.
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was omitted by our other sources because for their purposes it was
superfluous and stylistically disturbing, whereas it is difficult to explain
why any one should have added it if it was not present in his source.
Yet the matter is not so easily disposed of. For one thing, such
connectives are sometimes added for no reason at all. Moreover, in
this case, the variant may be due to a scribal mistake. For it is possible
that the first Tovde in T0TAEA0r0TT0TAE0NT02 was caused by
dittography. On the other hand, 56 is omitted both by Aristotle and
by Clement, who does not depend on Aristotle,^ and there is no
reason to think that they both purposely omitted this word. Such an
omission would more probably be due to scribes. Consequently, it
seems to be just as likely that Heraclitus wrote tov 5e Xbyov as that
he wrote tov Xbyov. If I have printed the latter reading, it is only to
call attention to the fact that the prevailing opinion is not as certainly
right as its proponents believe it to be. And hereafter whenever I
cite TOV Xbyov as the reading at the beginning of our text, it is with
the understanding that Heraclitus may well have written tov 5e Xbyov.
If TOV be Xbyov is the correct reading, then be is either connective
or inceptive. The latter possibility is that preferred by most recent
scholars.^ However, even now there are some who believe that bk is
connective and that in what preceded frag. 1 Heraclitus must have
given a hint as to what he meant by this Logos. '° This last contention
seems to me more than doubtful," and even if the 5e is connective,
it is likely, given the statements of Aristotle and of Sextus cited above,
that not much preceded our text.'^ On the other hand, if Heraclitus
wrote TOV Xbyov, it is likely that those words came at the very beginning
of his treatise, and the same is true if be is the right reading and is
inceptive.'^
" This ought to be obvious, since Clement's citation is longer than Aristotle's.
' Cf. e.g. Gigon, p. 1, Verdenius, op. cit. (note 5 supra), pp. 274-75; Kirk, p. 36.
'" Cf. e.g. M. L. West, Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient (Oxford 1971), pp.
114-15.
" West (cf. note 10 supra) cites with approval Diels' suggestion that something
like 'UpoLKktiToc, 'E^eaioi; rabi Xiya preceded frag. 1. But he does so on the assumption,
shared by others (cf. e.g. Burnet, p. 133 with n. 1), that 6 Xoyoc, S5t refers to Heraclitus'
own discourse. Yet it was because of this that Reinhardt, p. 217, n. 1 rejected the
di, for there are strong reasons for thinking that in frag. I Logos cannot primarily
mean Heraclitus' discourse or doctrine (cf. the concluding remarks of this paper).
However, Reinhardt did not consider the possibility that the 8e may be merely
inceptive.
'"^ It is hardly likely that either Aristotle or Sextus' source, who knew the relative
collocations of the present fragments 1 and 2 (cf. note 37 infra), would have said
that what they cite of frag. 1 came at the beginning of Heraclitus' book if a long
and/or important statement had preceded.
'' For inceptive 8i cf. Ion of Chios 36 B 1 apxfi Se noi tov Xoyov and Kirk, p. 36.
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A more fundamental question is the construction of aUi. Aristotle
cited the first words of our fragment precisely to illustrate his point
that it is difficult to "punctuate" {biaoTi^ai) the text of Heraclitus,
since it is unclear {abr]\ov) whether aUi goes with what precedes or
with what follows it.'"* Modern scholars are not agreed on this: some
take aui with eovroq, while others attach it to a^vueroL. Prominent
among the latter are Reinhardt, Snell, Kranz, Kirk, and Marcovich.'^
Their main argument is (i) that aiei leading up to /cat . . . Kai is an
archaic figure typical of Heraclitus' style. To this Marcovich has added
two arguments: (ii) In aul a^vveroL yipovrat. avOpcoiroL— in contrast
to the rhythmical unit tov be Xbyov toW I'ovtoz,— -there is an intentional
alliteration a-a-g-a; (iii) The construction of ai'ei with iovroc, is a lectio
facilior prompted by the influence of the epic formula mev ibureq
(Homer, //. I. 290, etc.). Now the seconi argument may be dismissed
with the remark that it begs the question, since it simply assumes
that Heraclitus meant aui to go with a^vveroL. Moreover, the allit-
eration alleged by Marcovich is of no significance as it is vowel
alliteration only. The third argument implies a misuse of the notion
of lectio facilior, but I postpone its discussion for later. As for the first
argument, it is anything but decisive, aui followed and taken up by
Kal . . . Kai is a normal construction in archaic and in later Greek, but
so is also the use of Kal . . . Kai in the sense "both . . . and," even
without a preceding aui. The essential point that must still be
established is whether here Heraclitus intended aui to be taken up
by Kal . . . Kai. I submit that there are strong reasons for thinking
that he did not.
However, before we go into this question, it is convenient to
determine what would be the likely meaning of tov Xbyov toW eburoq,
if aui goes with a^vveroi. For, given Aristotle's statement mentioned
above, one must acknowledge that the construction of aui with what
follows it must be possible, and hence that the construction tov Xbyov
T0O6' ebvToq must also be so. Of those who take aui with what follows,
Kranz, Kirk, and others"^ take ro06' as predicative: "The Logos being
this." But in that case one would have expected toloW instead of
Tovb\ or, at the very least, the toD6' to come after and not before
ibuToq. Kirk argues that the fact that in the next sentence Tbvbe is not
predicative in KaTa tov Xbyov Tbvbe "does not tell against its predicative
'^ Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1407 B 14-15 and 17-18.
'
' Reinhardt. pp. 217-18; A. Busse, Rhexw.sches Museum 75 (1926), 206-07; B.
Snell, Hermes 61 (1926). 366 = Gesaimnelte Schriften (Gottingen, 1966), p. 139, n. 3;
Kranz, FVS'' I, p. 150, note; Kirk, p. 34; Marcovich', p. 9 = Marcovich', p. 10.
"^ Kranz, FVS'', I, p. 150; Kirk, p. 35; J. Bollack and H. Wismann, Heraclite ou la
separation (Paris 1972), p. 61.
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use earlier."" But the question is whether any reader who was not
defending an interpretation would detach roOS' from the rest of the
phrase in tov \6yov rovd'. Moreover, the passage from 6 \byoc, to 6
Xoyoq o5e in the next sentence would at least be unnecessary. The
probability then is that tov5' is attributive, and it is so interpreted by
Marcovich and others.'^ In that case, one must take eovroq existentially
and probably having concessive force: "This Logos, existent, or real
though it is.'"^ This meaning gives a reasonable sense, but it consid-
erably weakens the force of the whole first sentence of the fragment,
especially when it is compared to the sense yielded by that sentence
when aui is construed with ebvToq.
One of the main objections against taking aui with oc^vueroL is that
the former word, prominently emphatic here, and important for
Heraclitus, as frag. B 30 shows {riv aid Kal earip Kal eaTaL),^° would
be almost otiose. Its omission would not at all affect what he is saying,
since Kal irpoadev rj bcKovoai Kal ctKovaavreq to irpcbTov would suffice to
convey the notion that men fail to understand the Logos both before
and after they have heard it. There would be only slightly more
emphasis if aui were taken up by Kal . . . Kai. Kirk himself unwittingly
betrays the weakness of taking aui with what follows when he states
that aui with eovroc, makes sense "and expresses something that
Heraclitus believed" but that "it is to be rejected only on the ground
that aui goes rather with a^uj/eroi."^' Moreover, since Heraclitus says
that men are uncomprehending both before they have heard the
Logos and after they have heard it, it makes better sense to take
aui with eovToq. For, unless the assertion is made that this Logos exists
always, that it is always present in the universe, that is, also before
men have heard it^^ from Heraclitus, it would be pointless to reproach
" Kirk, p. 35.
'* Cf. P. Tannery, Pour Vhistoire de la science hellene^ (Paris 1930), p. 198; Reinhardt,
p. 217, SneW, Hermes 6\ (1926), 365-66 = GesammelteSchriften, pp. 139-40; Marcovich',
p. 9 = Marcovich^, p. 9.
'^ The meanings "existent" and "real" are frequently connected with each other
and with the meaning "true." In the present case the. last mentioned meaning is also
possible, if by "true" we understand what is the case in the sense of what is real; but
the meaning "true" as the opposite of "false" is, I believe, impossible. Cf. Busse
(above, note 15), pp. 205-06.
^° In 22 B 30 one must punctuate with a colon after tarai, cf. Kirk, p. 310 with
references.
2' Kirk, p. 35.
^^ This to my mind is a decisive reason for rejecting those interpretations which,
like West's (op. cit. in note 10 supra, pp. 1 15 and 1 16), take 6 Xcr^oc, Sdt to mean "This
discourse of mine." If that were Heraclitus' meaning, then he would be blaming men
only for not understanding the Logos after they have heard it. But the fragment as
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them for not knowing it even before they had so heard it.^^ Finally,
with ebvToc, aui Heraclitus in all probability meant his readers and/
or hearers to recall the epic formula auv eovroc, used of the traditional
gods,^'* and the similar use of aei by Pherecydes (7 B 1 Zac, nev /cat
Xpovoc, riaap ad Kal Xdouir]) and perhaps by other authors of cosmo-
gonies. Marcovich contends that (in Heraclitus) to take aui with
iovTOQ, is a lectio facilior,^^ but this is really a misapplication of a valid
principle of textual criticism. There a variant reading is considered
to be a lectio facilior when it can be explained as an intentional change
from a reading that is more difficult to understand. In the present
case, however, it is most improbable that Heraclitus placed aUi next
to iouToq without intending his readers and/or hearers to recall the
formula of immortality applied to the gods of traditional Greek
mythology.^'' And if he intended to allude to this formula, it was in
order to suggest that it is the impersonal Logos, in accordance with
which all things happen in the universe, that is eternal and not the
traditional, anthropomorphic gods. And there is other evidence of
Heraclitus' hostility to anthropomorphism and to traditional Greek
mythological thought.^'
The preceding are, I submit, valid reasons for thinking that
Heraclitus meant aUi to go with eouroq. If this is so, it is surely
noteworthy that, with the exception of Aristotle, the extant ancient
authors who in citing or alluding to this part of the fragment make
it clear how they construe aui, all took this word with I'ovtoc,. They
are Clement, Amelius, Hippolytus, and perhaps Cleanthes.^^ It must
a whole and other relevant evidence (cf. e.g. 22 B 2, 17, 34, 50, etc.) show that
Heraclitus supposed that men could understand the universe by themselves, since he
blames them for not doing so.
-' This second argument has been rightly emphasized by Gigon, p. 6; Verdenius,
op. cit. (note 5 supra), p. 279; H. Cherniss, Selected Papers (Leiden, 1977), p. 16, n.
13.
-' Cf. Homer. //. I. 290, 494, XXIV. 99; Odyssey I. 263; Hesiod, Theog. 21, 33; Op.
718.
-'' Cf. Marcovich', p. 9 = Marcovich'^, p. 10.
'-'' The notion that oih can go both with ibvToq, and with a^vvtroi (cf. e.g. Gigon,
p. 2) must be rejected. Such an airo koivov construction is impossible here, since in
reading the text we would have to make a pause either after tovToc, or after oad. This
is precisely the point Aristotle makes when he cites the first few words of our
fragment. His testimony is incompatible with Gigon's suggestion.
'-'' Cf. 22 B 5, 15, 30, 40, 42, 53, 56, 57, 62, 67, 104, etc.
'"* That Clement took met with iovroc, is clear from the way he cites the fragment
{Strom. V. 111,7 [11, pp. 401-02 Stahlin]): avriKpvc, 6< 6 tilv "Hpa/cXftroi; "toO \byov rovd'
i6vT0<; oi'ei," ^T/ffij/, "a^weroi ktX." Hippolytus for his part precedes the citation of B 1
with the words (Ref. IX. 9. 3 [p. 241, Wendland]) Sti. 5( \byoc, iarlv au to irav Koi bia
iravTOc, ui>, ovtuc, Xeya. Amelius, cited by Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica XI. 19. 1 (II,
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also be said that, contrary to what is sometimes asserted,^^ Aristotle
does not state, nor necessarily imply, either, that the ambiguity of
aui is incurable. For Aristotle was not concerned with analyzing the
part of Heraclitus' statement he quotes. He was merely trying to find
an example of ambiguity in "punctuation"^" in connection with the
general rule "that a written composition should be easy to read and
therefore easy to deliver; for it is the same thing."^' But this rule is
violated when there are many connectives, "or where the punctuation
is difficult, as in the writings of Heraclitus."^^ He claims, after citing
the beginning of Heraclitus' first fragment, that it is unclear (adrjXov)
whether aui goes with what precedes or with what follows it.^^ Hence
for Aristotle the very fact that two constructions of aui are possible
suffices to make the construction abr]\ov and therefore difficult to
read and to deliver, for we would have to stop and think and give
arguments in favor or against one or the other construction.^*
However, that something is adrjXov means simply that it is not self-
evident or obvious; it does not necessarily follow that Aristotle himself,
if that had been his purpose, would not have been able to decide in
favor of one of the two possibilities he mentions. In other words,
Aristotle is recommending that we write in such a way as to avoid
all possible ambiguity, a rule he himself not infrequently violated.
The next point is to decide how the initial genitive should be
construed. Those who take aui with what follows, however they
construe the words to06' eovroq, take tov \6yov as an objective genitive
depending on a^vveroi. Even some of those who take aui with eovroq
also take the initial genitive to depend upon a^vperoi, while taking
ibvToq aui as modifying tov Xoyov tov6\^^ However, if one takes aui
with iovToq, there are good reasons for taking tov Xoyov tov8' tbvToq
p. 45 [Mras]), says: koL ovto^ apa rfv b Xoyoc, Kad' ov met ovra ra yivoneva eyiviTO, uq av
Kol b 'UpaKXeiToc, a^iwaeu ktX. As for Cleanthes, if in line 21 of his Hy7nn to Zeus we
read uaO' iva yiyvtadai iravruiv Xoyov auv tovra (cf. G. Zuntz, Harvard Studies in Classical
Philology 63 [1958], p. 303), it is likely that he there had Heraclitus in mind and that
he read ocid with eovToq in 22 B 1
.
''' Cf. e.g. Calogero, Gior Crit. della Filos. Ital. 17 (1936). 196.
'" Given the context, with biaaTt^ai Aristotle seems to mean some sort of dot or
stop to be made at appropriate places of a text in order to facilitate the reading of
it. Cf. also note 26 supra.
*' Aristotle, Rhetoric 1407 B 11-12.
'- Aristotle, Rhetoric 1407 B 12-14. It is noteworthy that Aristotle says, not that
it is impossible to punctuate Heraclitus' written statements, but that it is difficult to
do so: TOt yap 'Hpa/cXeirou Siaari^ai tpyov ktX.
'' Aristotle, Rhetoric 1407 B 17-18.
'^ Cf. notes 26 and 30 supra.
'' Cf. e.g. West, op. cit. (note 10 supra), p. 117.
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aiti as a genitive absolute, having concessive force: "Though this
Logos exists always men are uncomprehending both before they have
heard it and once they have heard it." In the first place, the assertion
of the perpetual existence of the Logos acquires emphasis from the
beginning, and greater prominence is given to the state of ignorance
in which men live. Secondly, the word a^vveroi, which for Heraclitus,
as Kirk himself says,^^ has a positive meaning and which he employs
in another fragment (B 34) in a similar way ("ignoramuses"), would
be used here too in an absolute, derogatory, and not merely negative
sense.
According to the testimony of Sextus, the second fragment of
Heraclitus in Diels' edition came soon after the first." If in the latter
aui was meant to be taken with iovroc,, and if the whole initial genitive
is absolute, then there is a striking parallel between tov \6yov to06'
(ouToq aui and tov \6yov 6' eovTOc, ^vuov in 22 B 2, which is certainly
a genitive absolute. ^^ It is in fact possible, perhaps even likely, that
the first part of Heraclitus' book contained a series of predicates of
the Logos, in the genitive absolute, followed by contrasting statements
in which men's failure to understand was emphasized. ^^
Two additional questions concerning the first sentence are the
meaning of the present yiuovrai and of to TrpobTou. To begin with the
latter, in all probability here it means "once" rather than "for the
first time.'"*" For it is Heraclitus' point that men are uncomprehending
both before they have heard the Logos and also after they have
heard it, not merely that they fail to understand it when they hear
it for the first time. This latter meaning would leave open the
possibility of men's understanding the Logos when they hear it for
the second or third time, etc., and such a meaning is precluded by
the rest of this fragment as well as by the rest of the related evidence.^'
As for yivovTaL, it is taken by Verdenius, who in this is followed
by Kirk,^^ as implying result: "men's coming across the Logos results
in incomprehension." This meaning is possible but not necessary, and
I doubt that it was here intended by Heraclitus. He thought that all
'•^ Cf. Kirk. p. 34.
" Sextus (Adv. Math. VII. 133), having cited B 1 and having commented on it,
says: 0X170 irpoaSuXOuv tVi^epa, and then quotes B 2.
^* I should like to emphasize that I do not base my interpretation of B 1 on the
parallelism between B 1 and B 2, as some scholars do (cf. e.g. Gigon, p. 3).
='9 Cf. 22 B 2.
^0 Cf. Kirk, p. 34 with his reference to LSJ, s.v. Ille.
" Both in this fragment and elsewhere (cf. e.g. 22 B 2, 17, 34, etc.) Heraclitus
speaks of men's failure to understand as characteristic of the human condition.
*^ Verdenius, op. cit. (note 5 supra), pp. 279-80; Kirk, p. 40.
Leonardo Taran 9
men live in a common world, but that they fail to see the common
law and system of the universe (cf. 22 B 1 14, 2, 30, SQ'*'); that is,
they fail to see how things are related to one another and, hence,
do not apprehend the Logos. Therefore, I think it preferable to take
a^vveroL yiuovTai to denote the state of ignorance in which men live
despite the fact that the Logos is always there and that Heraclitus
explains it to them. Like the above mentioned scholars, I see no
contrast between etvaL and yiyvecrdai implied in this fragment, as
Gigon thinks there is.*''
The purpose of the fragment's second sentence is not so much to
explain the state of ignorance in which men live as tojustify Heraclitus'
assertion to that effect. It begins with a concessive genitive absolute,
which tells us that "though all things happen according to this Logos,"
men are like people of no experience {airdpoKJiv), i.e. they are
ignorant. I believe the next participle, Teipwueuoi, is temporal-con-
cessive rather than purely concessive,"*^ and not frequentative, as Diels
and Marcovich, among others, take it.''^ It is not the case that men
are like the inexperienced each time they experience words and
deeds such as Heraclitus explains. Rather, though all things happen
according to this Logos, men are like the inexperienced even when
they experience (i.e. are acquainted with) words and deeds such as
Heraclitus explains. In other words, that men are ignorant before
they have heard the discourse of Heraclitus is bad enough; but it is
much worse that they continue to live in ignorance and fail to
understand even when they become acquainted with Heraclitus'
doctrine, for in this last case they had the opportunity to compare
Heraclitus' statements with the facts, as all things happen according
to this Logos.
The word-play aTreipoLaiu-TreLpicixeuoL is most probably intentional,
as are the similar ones in 22 B 2, 28, 48, 114, etc. According to
Kirk, "in the present case it is simply a stylistic trick and can imply
no underlying connexion of sense between the similar word-forms,
for the connexion is quite obvious.'"*^ Yet it is difficult to agree that
because a connection is quite obvious the word-play must be simply
a stylistic trick and nothing more than that. The word-play here does
convey the implication that men, though acquainted not only with
*'^ In B 89, at least the first part is, pace Kirk, authentic, cf. Vlastos, American
Journal of Philology 76 (1955), 344 ff.
^* Cf. Kirk, pp. 40-41 against Gigon, p. 3.
"^ Cf. also Kirk, pp. 33 and 41.
''*' Cf. Diels in earlier versions of FVS, an interpretation adopted also by Kranz in
the 6th edition. Marcovich', p. 9 = Marcovich^, p. 10.
'' Kirk, p. 41.
10 Illinois Classical Studies, XI
the facts but also with Heraclitus' doctrine, nevertheless are like the
inexperienced in that they fail to understand. Other fragments, too,
stress men's characteristic inability to understand;''® but here, in 22
B I , the point is made that if one fails to understand the Logos, then
one cannot really possess any true experience, which among other
things requires repetition and memory, memory of the connection
between the things that constitute a single experience/^ Similarly,
men may become acquainted (Treipci/nej^ot) with Heraclitus' doctrine
more than once but they still fail to understand, and so are like the
inexperienced. To my mind this is the reason why in this context the
word airupoc, was used for "ignorant." In fact, this fragment, not
mentioned by Liddell-Scott-Jones, s.v. «7reipog (A), is evidence of the
connection between the literal meaning "without trial or experience"
and the absolute sense "inexperienced," "ignorant."
The words eTrecoi/ koX tpycjiv were probably meant to recall the epic
formula eVog KaX epyov. Kirk says that in Heraclitus "the words are
the means of explanation, the deeds or events are the things which
are explained."^" This is true, but only up to a point. For there is
here an implication that men could see the Logos in language itself
even apart from their hearing it from Heraclitus. Now Heraclitus
believes that his doctrine is instantiated in human speech (cf. for
example the connection made between fiioq and ^ioq in 22 B 48 and
that between ^vv v6<f and ^vuoq in B 114), and so I suggest that he
meant that men by themselves could see the Logos there as well as
in the facts of experience. If this is so, then it is likely that he used
eireoiv Kal epy(t)u as a polar expression for "the whole of human
experience," as Reinhardt and others have thought.^'
The verb dtriyevnai has received little attention on the part of
interpreters, even though there has been a lot of discussion as to
whether Heraclitus' book was a collection ofaphorisms or a continuous
exposition. ^^ 1 agree with Walzer (p. 42, note 7) that dir]yeiadaL
indicates, not a collection ofaphorisms but rather a descriptive writing,
i.e. a treatise. The first fragment of Heraclitus supports such an
interpretation and so do, among others, 22 B 114, 30, etc. It is
*^ Cf. note 41 supra.
*^ Cf. Aristotle's words in Metaphysics 980 B 28 - 981 A 1: yiyueraL 5' m rfiq nvrjuriq
invfipia Toiq avdpCj-KOic; ai yap iroXXal ^ivfifiai tov avTOV irpaynaToc, niaz, i^nrap'uxc; bwafuv
airoTiXovaii/.
^" Kirk, p. 41.
^' Cf. Reinhardt, p. 218, Marcovich', p. 9 = Marcovich^, p. 10.
*^ Cf. Zeller in Zeller-Nestle, I, ii*^, p. 788, n. 1 and the references given by
Mondolfo in Zelier-Mondolfo, La filosofia dei Greci nel suo sviluppo storico (Florence
1961). pp. 13-15.
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therefore likely that the aphoristic character of other fragments is
due to the way they have been transmitted to us and not to Heraclitus
himself. But even if some of Heraclitus' utterances were aphorisms,
it is unlikely that the whole book was merely a collection of such
utterances. It is noteworthy that oKoio^v eyo) diriyevnai Kara (f)vaiv
diaipeoov tKaoTov koI 4>pa^(i)v oKmc, e'xft must refer to the whole or to
most of Heraclitus' treatise and not merely to its first part.
The two participial phrases, {di-qyevnaL) Kara (})v<nv biaipewv (Kaarov
Kal (t>pcx^ijjp oKOjq ex^i, have given rise to several different interpreta-
tions. First of all one must decide what is here meant by diaLpelv.
Marcovich takes it in the literal meaning "to divide," in the sense of
"taking apart." As examples he gives the bow in 22 B 51 (it consists
of two arms and of the unifying string) and the analysis of a word,
as in 22 B 48 ("the name and the function are the two constituent
parts of every given thing"). ^^ However, even apart from the fact
that his interpretation of B 5 1 is questionable and that the implication
he sees in B 48 is too far-reaching,^^ it is doubtful, in the light of
our evidence, that Heraclitus devoted the essential part of his treatise
to the type of analysis Marcovich describes. ^^ But I think Marcovich
is right in his attempt to relate the two participial phrases to the rest
of Heraclitus' statements. However, if we are to take biaipdv eKaarov
in the sense "to divide each thing," I believe that Heraclitus was
thinking of his predecessors' procedure of dividing their main "ma-
terial substances"^'' into contraries. Thus, for example, Anaximenes
asserted (using the mechanism of condensation and rarefaction) that
all was air and then proceeded to divide this body into contraries:
hot and cold, humid and dry, etc.^' It is this procedure on the part
of his predecessors that Parmenides illustrates when he describes the
opinions of mortals. ^^ If this is what Heraclitus meant by biaipdv
tKaoTov, then we must think of his doctrine of identity-in-difference,
of the unity of contraries, etc., which presupposes not only some sort
of classification of things into contraries but also contrariety in the
^' Marcovich', p. 10 = Marcovich^, pp. 10-11.
^^ Even in B 48 itself I cannot see that Heraclitus implies that the name and the
function of the bow are its two constituent parts.
** Heraclitus seems to place more emphasis on the bringing of things together
rather than on "taking them apart." The unity of things, i.e. of contraries, seems to
be what he claims as his most original contribution. Cf. 22 b 2, 10, 30, 41, 51, 54,
57, etc.
^^ By this expression I mean to refer simply to the most widely distributed bodies
in the universe mentioned by the Presocratics, e.g. water, fire, etc.
" Cf. Anaximenes 13 A 1, A 4, A 5, A 7, B 1, B 2, etc.
^* Cf. Parmenides 28 B 8, 55-59 with L. Taran, Parmenides (Princeton 1965), p.
225.
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things themselves. This procedure could be illustrated by fragments
such as B 1 2 iroranolaLU tolclu avToioLV ifx^aiuovaiv erepa Kal erepa
vSara iirtppel, B 36 xl/vxV'^t-v Bavaroq vdoop yevecrdaL, vdari de dauaroq
yfiv yivtaOai, B 48 toj to^co duofia 0ioq, epyov de dauaroc,, B 61 daXaaaa
vdicp Kadap6)TaT0v kol fjLiapojTarov, txdvai ixiv ttotihov Kal atcTrjpiou,
avdpojwoic, di airoTov Kal oXedpiov, etc. However, it is also possible that
we must take diaipelu here in the more general sense "to distinguish,"
as Kirk.-'-' among others does, for Heraclitus may have meant merely
to say that each thing*^" is described by him Kara (pvaiu. But I cannot
agree with Kirk that diaipeicv here is (merely) the process of analysis
that leads up to a judgment. It seems to be rather the process by
which a thing is described and thereby is differentiated from anything
else, though of course in Heraclitus that very differentiation will show
it to be related to everything else. As for Kara (J)volv, I should prefer
to take it not as "according to each thing's origin," nor as "according
to each thing's nature," nor as "according to each thing's real
constitution," but in its true adverbial meaning "properly," "as it
ought to be (sc. described)."*^' One objection common to the rejected
interpretations is that at this stage in his book it is not likely that
Heraclitus would have written Kara (f)V(XLV diaipecov if he had meant
to ascribe to 4>v(nc, a technical meaning. 1 agree with Verdenius and
Kirk°^ that OKonq e'xei is not a different process from Kara (t)V(TLV
biaipioiv, but that the two are related. Heraclitus proposes to describe
each thing correctly and so to be able to state how it is.
In the third and final part of the fragment, Heraclitus proceeds
to describe the kind of life the rest of men (rouq 6e aWovc; avdpo^Trovq)
lead because of their ignorance of the Logos, in strong contrast with
Heraclitus' own condition (eyo) dLrjyevnaL ktX.). Kirk and Marcovich,
among others, take the final part of the fragment to mean that the
rest of men fail to understand what they do once they are awake
(taking eyepdevreq as an ingressive aorist participle), just as they forget
what they do when they are asleep: "But the rest of men fail to
notice what they do after they wake up just as they forget what they
do when asleep" (Kirk's translation). Before discussing this interpre-
tation it may be well to indicate a point of agreement: ttolovolv, which
must also be supplied with the second clause, should not be interpreted
too literally, iroulu here refers not only to what men actually do but
•" Kirk, pp. 33 and 41-42.
''" In any interpretation of the words in question ^Kaarov is a rhetorical exaggeration.
"' Cf. J. W. Beardslee, Jr., The Use of <t>vaic, in Fifth-Century Greek Literature (diss.,
Chicago 1918), p. 47.
"'^ Verdenius, op. cit. (note 5 supra), p. 273; Kirk, pp. 42-43.
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also to their mental and emotional life. Moreover, the second clause
refers to our dreams when we are asleep; it certainly does not refer
primarily to the motions or gesticulations we may perform while we
are asleep. ^^
The difficulties of the interpretation they have adopted have not
escaped Kirk and Marcovich themselves, and are indeed formidable.
If we take iinXavdavovTaL to mean "they forget," then Heraclitus
would be saying that men once they are awake fail to recognize, to
see the ever-present truth just as they, on waking, forget what they
did in sleep, that is, they forget their dreams. However, in the first
place, it is not the case that men always forget their dreams; quite
frequently they do not forget them. And so we would have a first
important inconcinnity. Heraclitus would be comparing the perpetual
failure of ignorant men to understand the truth with something that
happens to men sometimes only. And there is evidence in Heraclitus
himself that he did not think that we always forget our dreams.^"*
Secondly, and even more important, even if men did forget their
dreams, it is hard to see the propriety of comparing men's customary
failure to know the truth with the fact that once they are awake they
forget their dreams. This difficulty should not be dismissed with
Kirk's remark that "slight inconsistencies in complex images are not
uncommon in the archaic style."*^^ The comparison would not be
slightly inconsistent but rather a non sequitur. Marcovich for his part
betrays the weakness of the interpretation to which he subscribes
when he states that "the sentence would be complete in itself even
without i-KLXavdavovTaL, (which cannot mean the same as Xavdavu):
possibly Heraclitus added this word for the sake of balance or of the
word-play."^*' For we would have to suppose that for the sake of
balance or of word-play Heraclitus added a word, iTriXavdavovTai,
and ruined the whole point of the comparison, as without it the
statement would yield a good sense: "But it escapes the rest of men
what they do once they are awake, just as it escapes them what they
do while they are asleep." I agree with Marcovich that eTVLXavBavovTai
does not mean the same as the preceding XavQavti, but to decide
what Heraclitus had in mind it is necessary to see first what he meant
by the comparison in general.
One must note two points. First, that to the man who knows the
Logos, specifically Heraclitus himself {eyd), the nescience of the rest
®' Contrast West, op. cit. (note 10 supra), p. 116, who thinks that the reference is
to bodily movements which men make while asleep.
^^ Cf. 22 B 21 with B 26; B 75; B 89.
" Kirk, p. 44.
^^ Marcovich', p. 10 = Marcovich^, p. 11.
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of humanity in wakefulness is strongly contrasted. Secondly, Heraclitus
must have meant to compare men's failure to apprehend the Logos
when they are awake with what happens to them when they are
asleep and dreaming. In other words, he is comparing two states,
and we must keep in mind that to sleep and dream is for Heraclitus,
as Kirk himself says, "a real if diminished form of activity."*^' Now
iinXaudavonaL literally means "to let something which one previously
knew escape one's notice" ;*^^ here, used of what happens to men
while they are dreaming, it must refer to this: the successive images
we see in our dreams escape our notice in such a way that we do not
understand— because we are not conscious of— the nature of what
we do in our sleep. This is in fact the way in which some interpreters
have understood eTnXaudauouTai in this fragment. *^^ To Kirk's and
Marcovich's objection that there is no parallel to such a meaning,
one must answer that it is the context that is crucial for deciding
what a word means. Moreover, the middle iTnXavdavonaL or eTriXrjdofiaL
frequently bears the meaning "to forget" in the sense of "not being
conscious of." Thus, for example, when at the beginning of Plato's
Apology (17 A 2-3) Socrates says iyoo 6' ovv /cat avrbq utt' avTo:v oXiyov
enavTov i-KiXadb^irjv, he surely means to say that the effect of his
accusers' speeches was such that he almost "forgot himself" in the
sense of "not being conscious of who he really was." If this interpre-
tation is right, then the comparison makes sense: "(in contrast to
Heraclitus who knows the Logos) it escapes the rest of men what
they do once they are awake, just as when they are asleep they are
unconscious of (i.e. do not understand) what they do." Heraclitus
does not mean to say that the rest of men when awake have no
knowledge at all of what they do but only that the true significance
of it escapes them. For example, they see day and they see night, but
they do not understand that night and day are a single thing (cf. 22
B 57). The interpretation of the final comparison given here makes
better sense of e-yepdeureq as an ingressive aorist than that of Kirk and
Marcovich does. In their interpretation the comparison would be
between two things that happen when men are awake: they fail to
understand the Logos just as they forget their dreams. In my
interpretation, men, once they are awake, fail to understand the
Logos just as when they were asleep they did not understand their
" Kirk, p. 44.
**" Kirk, p. 44.
^^ Cf. e.g. Gigon, p. 6; Kranz FVS^ I, p. 150; Walzer, p. 41; H. Frankel, American
Journal of Philology 59 (1938), 318 with n. 18.
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dreams. The implication is that the waking life of the ignorant
majority has a dreamlike quality.
This fragment, then, implies the geometrical proportion-pattern
"the man who knows the Logos is to men awake who fail to understand
it as the latter are to those who are asleep and dreaming."'" The
pattern A:B::B:C was used by Heraclitus in other connections also,''
and the specific one implied in the first fragment is also to be
reconstructed with good probability from other texts. '^
This is not the place to discuss the meaning of Logos in Heraclitus,
since several other fragments would have to be taken into account.
Nevertheless, something can be gathered even from this fragment
itself, and belongs to the present discussion because it affects the
interpretation of our text. The main point is that the Logos cannot
be simply Heraclitus' discourse,'^ nor can it even refer principally to
it.'^ For it is clearly implied here that men could have known the
Logos even before they heard it from Heraclitus.'^ All things happen
according to the Logos, yet men are like the inexperienced even
when they experience such words and deeds as Heraclitus describes;
it follows that the Logos is always there but men fail to understand
it because they fail to see the connection that exists between all the
facts with which they are acquainted. In short, the Logos must be a
formula or pattern in accordance with which all things happen in the
universe. The discourse of Heraclitus expounds and explains this
Logos, but the Logos' existence is independent of it. The discourse
of Heraclitus "is" the Logos only in the sense that it describes the
formula according to which all things happen in the universe; but
the two are not identical, and they are clearly differentiated in frag.
B 50: ovK eixoi) aWa tov Xoyov aKovaavraq ktX.
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I do not mean to say that this geometrical pattern was the main purpose of
this part of the fragment, but that it is implied there.
" Cf. especially H. Frankel, "A Thought Pattern in Heraclitus," American Journal
of Philology 59 (1938), 309-37, though there is no need to follow him in all his
interpretations of individual fragments.
" Cf. 22 B 89 with B 72 and Cherniss, Selected Papers, p. 39 with n. 13.
'^ As e.g. West, op. cit. (note 10 supra), pp. 115 and 1 17 would have it.
''' As Burnet, p. 133 and n. 1, suggests.
" Cf. note 22 supra.

